

# **Detroit Public Schools Office of the Auditor General**



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## **OPERATIONAL AUDIT OF THE OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY**

**Report No: 09-200**

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**REPORT DATE: JULY 31, 2009**

## Results in Brief

Poor work attendance by Public Safety Officers, lack of control over assets including vehicles and cash receipts, and questionable procurement practices have resulted in excessive overtime, a lack of accountability for assets and cash, and more than 75 percent of Office of Public Safety's (OPS) expenditures paid to three favored vendors. In addition, the OPS is using unauthorized software applications and a stand-alone system to run its computer operations for which only one former employee is knowledgeable. This condition raises concerns about business continuity in the event the system were to crash as the system is not currently supported by the Information Technology division.

Our audit of the Office of Public Safety revealed that on average Police and Security Officers worked one month less than the minimal number of days assigned. This requires an officer to use all of their 12 vacation and 17 sick leave days as well as the 12 District holidays and then taking off another month. The average amount of time off for both 10 and 12 month employees including clerical staff is significant. For the two year period 2008-2009, 55 OPS employees were on Workers Compensation and 11 of these individuals received benefits both years. The number of work days missed results in manpower shortages and increases the need for overtime. We were told by an OPS management official that OPS does not award overtime to officers with poor attendance, however, we found that of the 58 Police officers 28 worked less than the minimum amount of days assigned and all of these officers received overtime hours. Furthermore, OPS is not effectively managing its overtime costs. For example, the actual amount of overtime in 2007-08 was \$790,604 or 740,604 over the budgeted \$50,000 for overtime. Although the overtime expense of \$465,369 was much lower in 2008-09, it still exceeded the budgeted amount by over \$400,000 or 830 percent.

The absence of inventory controls over equipment, stock items and vehicles has resulted in unused assets that could be sold or used by other District departments, and insurance expenses associated with unused vehicles in the fleet. We conducted an inventory of OPS stock items and found 160 blackberry phones, 97 two-way phones, 1872 master locks, 132 safety kits, 50 hand-held radios and 13 printers stored away at OPS facilities that were not recorded in the inventory records. Some of the items were brand new, but all appeared to be in good shape and could have been used by other departments or sold.

Our inventory of OPS assets included tracking 107 guns to a list we created from various documents found at the OPS headquarters. OPS did not have a master gun list that tracked purchases, issuances, returns and disposals. Of the 107 guns including 61 purchased in 2006, the OPS was able to account for all the guns including two guns that were documented and reported as stolen and one gun that is currently at the Detroit Crime Lab. However, tracking all the guns took a few days of concerted effort by the audit team and OPS staff because the department did not maintain a centralized file tracking the guns from purchase to disposal. As a result of the audit, OPS has compiled a master listing of its weapons that should be maintained and updated to track DPS-issued weapons from purchase to disposal.

In addition, the audit team inventoried 11 motorcycles and a 1996 Chevrolet Impala in a bay located at OPS' headquarters that were insured but not being used.

Our review of OPS' replacement badge process found \$750 in money orders in the desk drawer of the former Chief of OPS. The money orders accounted for 30 badges at \$25 each. We found no documentation to support this activity nor could we identify where any prior monies collected for replacement badges were deposited in a bank account. We attempted to contact the former Chief of OPS, but were unsuccessful in our efforts. Currently, the department has no procedures in place to ensure collected funds are properly safeguarded.

We also noted over 75 percent of OPS expenditures were paid to three vendors over a three-year period, with more than 60 percent going to one vendor who provided integrated security services for school-based surveillance systems. The spending pattern at OPS raise questions about OPS' relationship with these vendors and whether they were providing competitively priced services to the District. The contract for the vendor receiving over 60 percent of the total expenditures was awarded in August 2006 for \$780,000 but was amended twice—once in 2007 for an additional \$760,000 and then again in 2008 for another \$850,000. The total amount of the contract with the amendments was nearly \$2.4 million, or more than 3 times the original amount. Similarly, OPS awarded a contract to a different vendor in September, 2006 for \$520,000 to provide the same services—replacement parts and maintenance on school-based security systems. This contract was also amended twice for a total contract amount of \$1.1 million, or nearly twice the original contract amount. The third vendor was awarded a contract in 2006 to provide guard security services. This contract was extended twice for a total award of \$89,175.

The contracts awarded for replacement parts and maintenance services for the school security systems are time and material contracts (i.e., the district is charged for the vendors time and materials plus a markup). However, we found that OPS did not monitor vendor performance and specifically failed to review vendor invoices to ensure services that were billed were actually performed. We believe the lack of monitoring has resulted in over-billings. For example, we noted a service order issued in 2007 for service repair work at a school which indicated a start time of 12:45 and ending time of 3:30; however, the vendor billed 4 hours at \$75 per hour. An invoice from the other vendor providing maintenance services for schools security systems included a \$60 mileage fee for service calls, but the contract did not include a provision authorizing such a fee. If management reviewed these invoices any question related to over-billing could have been addressed prior to payment.

Finally, the use of unauthorized software and hardware by OPS to support its school security systems prohibits Information Technology (IT) from supporting OPS operations. An employee who is no longer employed with OPS created the systems, however, according to IT officials; they have been concerned for some time about the stand-alone systems in place at OPS. In the event OPS operations were interrupted due to a fire or natural disaster, IT would not be able to help OPS restore its operations as it does not currently have backup data for OPS. The new management team at OPS is working with IT to ensure that the computer systems in place meet IT specifications and will be supportable going forward.

## Objective, Scope & Methodology

The audit objectives were to (1) assess the design and effectiveness of internal controls in place to ensure effective and efficient operations at OPS and (2) identify areas of needed improvement that will provide a base-line for the new management team in place at OPS. The scope of our audit covered Fiscal Years 2007-2008 and 2008-2009.

This audit was conducted by two contracted auditors who were supervised by the Office of the Auditor General during the period of June 18, 2009 to July 17, 2009. The auditors employed a mixed approach of inquiry, direct observation and review of departmental records. Auditors obtained payroll and accounts payable data from DPS Payroll and Accounting to review employee overtime and departmental expenditures. The audit team also conducted an inventory of OPS assets, DPS-issued guns, and the department's fleet of vehicles at three DPS locations. The audit team interviewed OPS staff including the newly-appointed Chief of OPS about the procedures and operations, but efforts to interview the former Chief were unsuccessful. We also interviewed representatives from Risk Management and Information Technology about insurance on OPS vehicles and risks associated with OPS' use of unauthorized software applications.

## **DETAILED REPORT**

## Background

The Detroit Public Schools Office of Public Safety (OPS) employs approximately 366 security personnel. Of the 366 employees 308 employees are unarmed security officers and 58 are armed Police Officers. Armed officers are certified annually and have similar authority as the local municipal police. The Mission of the Office of Public Safety is to provide a safe and secure environment for students and staff, conducive to learning. In addition OPS is responsible for safeguarding DPS assets. The OPS is headquartered at 9001 Woodward in Detroit; however, OPS officers are assigned to various locations (i.e., schools, Board meetings, etc) throughout the district to provide a safe environment and monitor the security of districts assets.


As an urban inner-city school district, students attending Detroit Public Schools, face many challenges. Of all the challenges, the safety and security of these students as they travel to and from school is a primary concern for parents, teachers and DPS management. The Emergency Financial Manager took actions to address this concern in June, 2009 by appointing a new Chief and Deputy Chief of OPS and making organizational changes within the department. The ultimate goal of these actions is to provide a comprehensive safety and security plan for DPS students.

**Poor Attendance  
Increases Overtime Expenses**

Poor work attendance on the part of OPS officers and clerical staff has contributed to overtime expenses incurred by the department. During School Years 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 Police and Security Officers did not meet the minimal available work hours. On average Police and Security Officers worked one month less than the minimal number of days assigned. This requires an officer to take their 25 vacation and 17 sick leave days as well as being off for the 12 District holidays and then taking off another month. For the two year period 2008 and 2009, 55 OPS employees were on Workers Compensation and 11 of these individuals received the benefits in both years. The number of work days missed results in manpower shortages and increases the need for overtime. We were told by an OPS management official that OPS does not award overtime to officers with poor attendance, however, we found that of the 58 Police officers 28 worked less than the minimum amount of days assigned and these officers received overtime hours.

In addition, as shown in the graph below, a review of OPS attendance records revealed that OPS staff collectively took 4,996 and 5,075 person illness days in 2007 and 2008, respectively. The unscheduled time off creates staffing difficulties and can lead to higher overtime expenses to ensure that staffing shortages are addressed.

**Graph 1.1: Personal Illness Days Taken By OPS Staff in 2007 and 2008**



Our analysis of OPS overtime expenses found that for the School Year 2007-2008, the department incurred \$790,604 in overtime expenses which were 1,481 percent over budget and for School Year 2008-2009 overtime charges of \$465,394 were 830 percent over budget. In both years the overtime budget was \$50,000. The large unfavorable variances of actual expenses exceeding budget for two consecutive years is a strong indicator that OPS is not effectively managing its overtime.

A review of overtime expenses for four clerical employees at OPS for School Years 2007 – 2008 and 2008-2009 revealed on the average, 22 and 26 percent, respectively of their total hours worked was overtime hours. In addition, the OPS timekeeping clerk entered

their own overtime hours, which is a lack of segregation of duties that increases the risk of fraud.

### **Controls Needed To Provide Greater Accountability Over OPS Assets**

The Office of Public Safety lacks inventory controls to account for its assets. Specifically, OPS did not have a fixed asset listing to account for its equipment and stock items. The audit team conducted an inventory of OPS equipment, stock items, and other noteworthy assets maintained in storage at three OPS facilities. We found many items were either new or slightly used. There were no centralized records to identify items available for use by OPS or other DPS departments. The inventoried items had a unit costs ranging from \$96.00 to \$5,000. Specifically, we found 160 Blackberry cell phones having an estimated value of \$63,840, 21 metal detectors valued at \$104,895, and 97 two-way phones valued at \$24,250. In total, we estimate the value of these items to be over \$238,000 (See Appendix I). In addition several low value dollar items that had not been used were counted including 1,872 Master Padlocks, 1,870 VHS tapes, 586 motion detectors and 501 switch boxes. The lack of control over fixed assets and stock items can lead to excessive and unnecessary purchases. At the same time, having items stored on site without any current record of such items increases the risk of theft (See Appendix II for full list of inventoried assets).

### **DPS Weapons**

OPS did not maintain a master gun list that tracked new gun purchases, issuances to officers, returns and disposals. Instead, the department maintained its gun information on piece-meal documentation--sheets of paper, log books and a spreadsheet printout. Based on the audit team's inquiries, the department conducted a gun inventory that accounted for all of the 107 guns issued including two guns that were reported as stolen and one gun that is currently at the Detroit Crime Lab. However, tracking all the guns took a few days of concerted effort by the audit team and OPS staff because the department did not maintain a centralized file for its weapons. Going forward, the department should ensure that its listing is updated for new gun purchases, returns and disposals.

### **Vehicles**

OPS does not maintain a vehicle log and OPS personnel could not validate the number fleet vehicles assigned to the department or where the vehicles were located. Additionally, there were no maintenance logs available that documented repairs and the condition of vehicles in the fleet. OPS vehicles are located at various locations throughout the city (OPS Headquarters, Grant School, Farnsworth and East 5 N West Terminals). We conducted an inventory of all OPS vehicles and found 80 vehicles; however, we noted 15 of these vehicles were inoperable--12 were considered scrap and 3 have accident damage. During an inventory walkthrough of OPS Headquarters, the audit team located a 1996 Chevrolet Impala in a bay area (See picture below). Although some OPS staff was aware of the vehicle's existence, it did not appear to be common

knowledge that the vehicle was being stored at the headquarters location nor was it evident that it was a DPS-owned vehicle.

1996 CAPRICE CLASSIC/IMPALA SS



In addition, there were eleven motorcycles housed at the OPS Headquarters that have not been used for 8 to 10 years and the mileage on these motorcycles ranged from 168 miles to 9,717 miles. The vehicle and the motorcycles were insured, but not being used.

### **Lack of Cash Management Controls Increases Risk**

The lack of cash management controls over the badge replacement process increases the risk that funds could be lost or stolen. The OPS provides replacement picture identification badges for DPS employees who lose their badges at a cost of \$25. We reviewed the checking account activity maintained by OPS and found limited account activity. We found \$750 in money orders in the desk drawer of the former Chief of OPS which had been received for replacement badge fees. The money orders accounted for 30 badges at \$25 each, but we found no documentation supporting this activity nor could we identify any prior monies collected for replacement badges.

We also found evidence that another account existed, but were unable to get any banking information on this account without additional information. According to OPS officials, the former Chief of OPS handled all banking activity from the badge replacement process. We attempted to contact the former Chief, but were unsuccessful. Although the department maintains a log of activity, we could not reconcile the activity with the funds identified nor could we determine how monies were disbursed from the account without additional documentation. Funds from badge replacement fees should be receipted by one individual and verified by another and maintained in a commercial account which is reconciled monthly. Any disbursements from this account should be approved with adequate documentation to support items purchased.

## **Most OPS Expenditures Went to Three Vendors**

Between 2007 through May 2009, we noted that OPS spent \$2,305,791 or over 75 percent of its total expenditures (\$2,982,669) with three vendors. One of the vendors, an integrated security systems company, received \$1,783,836 or over 60 percent of the expenditures during this period for providing maintenance service and replacement parts for school security systems. The spending pattern at OPS raises questions about OPS' relationship with these vendors and whether they were providing competitively priced services to the District.

The contract for the vendor receiving over 60 percent of the total expenditures was for replacements parts and maintenance service for the schools security systems and was awarded in August 2006 for \$780,000 but was amended twice—once in 2007 for an additional \$760,000 and then again in 2008 for another \$850,000. The total amount of the contract with the amendments was nearly \$2.4 million, or more than 3 times the original amount. Similarly, OPS awarded another contract to a different vendor in September, 2006 for \$520,000 to provide the same services—replacement parts and maintenance on school based security systems. This contract was also amended twice for a total contract amount of \$1.1 million, or nearly twice the original contract amount. The third vendor was awarded a contract in 2006 to provide guard security services. This contract was extended twice for a total award of \$89,175.

The two contracts for replacement parts and maintenance of school security systems are time and material contracts whereby the District is charged a fee for the vendors' time and the cost of materials plus an agreed upon markup. For these types of contracts, it is imperative to review vendor invoices to ensure that the hours and materials billed are accurate and not overstated. A review of a small sample vendor invoices disclosed several instances where hours billed were more than the hours actually worked. For example, we noted a service order issued in 2007 for service repair work at a school which indicated a start time of 12:45 and ending time of 3:30; however, the vendor billed 4 hours at \$75 per hour. In addition, we noted invoices included a \$60 mileage fee for service calls, but we found no provision in the contract authorizing this fee. The OPS does not require vendors to submit estimates for service repairs. In many cases, the department simply pays what the vendor invoices after the repair has been completed. If management reviewed vendor invoices any questions related to billings could be addressed prior to payment.

## **Unauthorized Applications Limits IT Support**

The IT applications that operate the district's school security systems were created and operated by an OPS employee that is no longer with the district. The applications are run on a stand-alone hardware system and both the applications and hardware are not supported or authorized by DPS IT. In addition, there are no documented system flows or disaster recovery plans in place which are needed in the event of a business interruption as a result of a system crash or a natural disaster. OPS security systems are

vital in protecting students, district employees and DPS assets. If OPS' unsupported system becomes inoperative the District could be exposed to a greater risk of reduced security.

According to DPS IT Officials, they were concerned about OPS using unauthorized software on a stand-alone system. During the course of our audit, we notified DPS IT about our concerns and they promptly initiated an effort to work with OPS management officials to ensure applications at OPS are supportable and to address any business continuity concerns resulting from using unauthorized applications and hardware.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

Our audit of OPS found a general lack of control over operations that, at a minimum, expose the department to waste and possible theft. More importantly, any risk that threatens the continued operations of OPS poses a greater risk to the safety of DPS students and DPS employees. In order to meet their stated mission of providing a safe and secure environment for students and staff, the OPS must have adequate staffing particularly at key times prior to and after school when the safety of students is most challenged. Given the poor attendance and excessive time off by OPS officers, meeting this mandate will continue to pose a significant challenge. Although overtime for officers cannot be avoided due to the nature of their duties, it should be pre-approved and actively managed to avoid abuses. At the same time, we believe poor attendance by officers is a major contributing factor to the overtime expenses and efforts to address the attendance issue will have a favorable impact on overtime.

The lack of centralized, accurate inventory records is an issue for the entire District, but each department has a responsibility to ensure that their assets are properly accounted for and documentation is reviewed for accuracy and completeness. Storing items throughout three locations without adequate records can result in unnecessary purchases and denies the opportunity for other departments to use such items. Moreover, the value of these items are not being captured and that value decreases over time. Given the current financial challenges facing the District, unused or un-needed items could be sold to offset cost or to generate needed revenue.

In addition, the lack of cash management controls over the badge replacement process exposes the department to the risk of loss due to theft. Monies obtained from this process should be receipted by one person and verified by another, documented in a ledger that ties to a DPS employee whose name and department is also documented in a log. All fees generated from replacement badges should be deposited in a commercial account in the department's name in a timely manner and that account should be reconciled monthly.

Given the practice employed by OPS of extending existing contracts by exercising options to amend the contract, the District has no assurance it is getting the most competitive prices for replacement parts and maintenance on school security systems. This is compounded by OPS' practice of not monitoring vendor performance and reviewing invoices for work performed, which we believe has resulted in over-billings that go unchallenged.

Finally, for too many years, the department has operated in a vacuum with limited oversight. As a result, certain practices that were permitted under the former Chief were deemed acceptable even though they may have posed a risk to the operations. Moreover, by allowing one person to have unchallenged control over all OPS operations without adherence to District policies and procedures, proper checks and balances was almost non-existent. The appointment of a new management team at OPS and the restructuring of the department within DPS should foster an environment of positive change. These actions, coupled with added controls over operations should help the department achieve its mission in an efficient and cost-effective manner.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

To ensure management is aware of all of its assets, the location and safeguarding of such assets as well as knowing that its assets are being fully used, we recommend that Department Management:

- Establish inventory procedures for all assets including equipment, stock items and vehicles which are updated at least annually,
- Maintain an accurate, updated master listing of all weapons that documents the purchase, issuance, return and disposal of all DPS-issued guns,
- Establish cash management procedures over the replacement badge process to ensure that all funds received are documented, accounted for and timely deposited into a commercial account,
- Award replacement part and maintenance contract for school security systems through a competitive bid process, and
- Work closely with DPS Information Technology (IT) staff to ensure that OPS' computer operations are authorized and supportable by IT and can be restored in the event a business interruption occurs.

## **MANAGEMENT RESPONSE**

We discussed the audit findings and recommendations with the Chief of OPS and the Inspector General whom concurred with the findings and recommendations, but did not provide a written response.

Our audit was performed in accordance with U.S. General Accounting Office Government Auditing Standards and Standards of the Institute of Internal Auditors.


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*Odell W. Bailey*

Odell W. Bailey, CIA  
Auditor General

OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY  
INVENTORY  
Appendix I

**GARRETT METAL DETECTORS**



OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY  
INVENTORY  
Appendix I

**SWIFT MAJOR TRAMA FIRST AID KITS**



## Appendix II

		WP Ref:	
Signoffs		Name	Date
Prepared By:		ES	06/29/09
1st Level Reviewer		GT	07/07/09

**Process:**

**Fixed Asset**

**Control Objective:**

To ensure all assets for each location are listed on the DPS Fixed Asset Register

**Population:**

All Fixed Assets at all four locations. Office of Public Safety headquarters - 9001 Woodward, Drew Elementary - 9600

**Testing Guidance**

Inventory all high level expense items at each location.

**Work Performed:**

Item No.	Description	Quantity	Manufacturer	Serial Number	Location	WP Ref	Additional Comments
1	First Aid Kit	132	Swift	14-5225	WH 1	FAP-1	Manufacture date 4/2006
2	Sirens	10			WH 1		Open Boxes
3	Metal Detectors	21	Garrett Electronics	1167500	WH 1		
4	Handheld Radios	50	Motorola	Model # H18UCF9PW6AN	War Room Kitchen		Out of boxes
5	High Seed USB 2.0 8 in 1 media readers	22	Belkin	Various	War Room Kitchen		One out of box
6	HP Officejet Pro	1	HP		War Room Kitchen		Open box
7	Desktop	1	IBM		War Room		DPS tag 060140
8	Whiteboard	1	Quartett Ovonics		War Room		
9	Printer - 2000C	1	Hewelett Packard		War Room		
10	Printer - Office Jet G85	1	Hewlett Packard		War Room		
11	Television	1	Video Viewer		War Room		DPS tag 042288
12	Cable Box	1	Hughes		War Room		
13	Monitor	2	Pelco		War Room		
14	Dell Photo All in one Printer	13	Dell		Oven		one open
15	E773	3	Dell		Oven		
16	Desktop	2	Compaq		Front Office		DPS tag 727423
17	Printer - HP Deskjet 6540	1	HP		Front Office		
18	Desktop - Deskpro EN	1	Compaq		Front Office		DPS tag 727483
19	Data card camara	1	Videology	108220947	Front Office		
20	Printer - Super G3	1			Front Office		Looks broken
21	Compaq Prisarior	1	Compaq	mxk4440qt2	Front Office		Behind cubical
22	Printer HP deskjet 5550	1	HP		Front Office		Behind cubical
23	Datacard Image card Select 2	3	Advanced Imaging Techology		Front Office		1 in front of cubicle, 1 behind cubicle & 1 in open
24	2 ton hyd. Trolley jack in case	16		model RHo7304	Behind Weight Room		

**Appendix II**

<b>Item No.</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Quantity</b>	<b>Manufacturer</b>	<b>Serial Number</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>WP Ref</b>	<b>Additional Comments</b>
25	Nextel i390	97	Motorola		Behind Weight Room		5 in a box, 18 boxes plus 7 loose
26	Locks	1872	Master Lock		Behind Weight Room		26 cases of 72 locks 1 open box not included
27	Anti Freeze	36	Pitt Penn		Behind Weight Room		6 cases of 6 1 gallon bottles
28	Defibrillator	9	Medtronic		Behind Weight Room		
29	Washer Solvent	13	Sta-Kleen		Behind Weight Room		
30	Computer Forms	46	Office Choice		North Front		9 1/2 x 11 no break feedable
31	NPG 12 toner	5	Cannon		North Front File Cabinet		
32	Printer Cartridge 15	6	HP		North Front File Cabinet		
33	Risograph RA ink	4	Riso		North Front File Cabinet		
34	Toner 514	4	Xerox		North Front File Cabinet		
35	Laser Jet Printer Cartridge 10A	1	HP		North Front File Cabinet		
36	PIR Motion Detector	25	Ademco	Model # 998PI	Crib		
37	50' x 60' lens Alternate Polarity QUAD	143	Ademco	Model # 1992	Crib		
38	Passive Inferred Motion Detector	586	Ademco	Model # 1877	Crib		
39	Shallow Switch Boxes	501	Wiremold	Model 5747	Crib		Estimate based on rough count
40	Hard Drive	5	Maxtor	P/N 9DZ0A6-591	Crib		
41	Digital Video Recorder	7	Pelco	8000 Series	Crib		
42	Emergency Response Guide Books	400	JJ Keller		Closet behind cells		
43	Monitor	7	Various		Closet behind cells		2 out of boxes
44	Laptops	29	HP		Closet behind cells		Possibly from a B&E
45	Desktops	9	Various		Closet behind cells		Possibly from a B&E
46	Cell Phones	160	BlackBerry	7290	Closet behind cells		
47	Warning Systems	4	Star Warning Systems		Closet behind cells		
48	Car	1	General Motors	Impalla	Oven		1G1BL52P1TR147007
49	VHS Video Tapes	320	Maxwell	6hr tapes	Cage		
50	VHS Video Tapes	600	Maxwell	T-120	Cage		
51	VHS Video Tapes	950	Ultra Tech	T160	Cage		up to 40 hours of real motion time lapse recording
52	Dekk Optiplex GX280 w/screen & keyboard	1	Dell		Supervisor Room		DPS Tag 824252
53	Dekk Optiplex GX280 w/screen & keyboard	1	Dell		Supervisor Room		DPS tag 824227
54	Dekk Optiplex GX280 w/screen & keyboard	1	Dell		Supervisor Room		DPS tag 824224

## Appendix II

Item No.	Description	Quantity	Manufacturer	Serial Number	Location	WP Ref	Additional Comments
55	Dekk Optiplex GX280 w/screen & keyboard	1	Dell		Supervisor Room		DPS tag 824226
56	PicBridge Printer	1	Printbridge	Service Tag 1LBK61	Supervisor Room		No tag
57	PicBridge Printer	1	Printbridge	4DX7K61	Supervisor Room		No tag
58	PicBridge Printer	1		681BK61	Supervisor Room		No tag
59	PicBridge Printer	1		BDX7K61	Supervisor Room		No tag
60	Battery Charger	1	Impres		Supervisor Room		No tag
61	Presario w/flat screen & keyboard	1	Compaq	MXK444ORFC	Supervisor Room		No tag
62	Dell 1710n Printer	1	Dell				No tag

**Comments Regarding Work Performed:**

Additional summary work sheet